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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the speciﬁc criticism of directed
altruistic living organ donation that it creates a ‘beauty
contest’ between potential recipients of organs. The
notion of the beauty contest in transplantation was
recently used by Neidich et al who stated that ‘[a]ltruism
should be the guiding motivation for all donations, and
when it [is], there is no place for a beauty contest’.
I examine this beauty contest objection from two
perspectives. First, I argue that, when considered against
the behaviour of donors, this objection cannot be
consistently raised without also objecting to other
common aspects of organ donation. I then explore the
beauty contest objection from the perspective of
recipients, and argue that if the beauty contest is
objectionable, it is because of a tension between
recipient behaviour and the altruism that supposedly
underpins the donation system. I conclude by brieﬂy
questioning the importance of this tension in light of the
organ shortage.
INTRODUCTION
This paper will explore the speciﬁc criticism of direc-
ted altruistic living organ donation (DALD) that it
creates a ‘beauty contest’ between potential recipients
of organs. The notion of the beauty contest in trans-
plantation was recently used by Neidich et al who
stated that ‘[a]ltruism should be the guiding motiv-
ation for all donations, and when it [is], there is no
place for a beauty contest’ (p.43).1 I will examine
this beauty contest objection from the perspective of
donors and recipients, and will argue that the poten-
tial conﬂict with altruism does not, as may often be
thought, arise from the actions of the donors, but
rather from the behaviour of the potential recipients.
I will argue that whether this poses a problem for
DALD rests on the disputed role of altruism in organ
donation.
BACKGROUND
There is a shortage of organs available for trans-
plantation in the UK, so patients often have to
endure long periods of illness before they eventu-
ally receive a transplant, or sometimes they die
before being offered a transplant. There are two
overarching approaches to increasing the number
of donated organs: increasing deceased donations
or increasing living donations. Increasing the
number of deceased donations can be achieved by
improving consent rates and effectively using
poorer-quality organs. Increasing the number of
living donors is more difﬁcult because it relies on
healthy individuals putting themselves forward for
major surgery to beneﬁt others.
Historically, living donation was only permitted
when the donor and recipient were either genetically
related or in an appropriate qualifying relationship.2
This changed in 2007 when the ﬁrst non-directed
altruistic living donation (N-DALD) was permitted,
and a healthy donor gave a kidney to a stranger on
the waiting list. N-DALD organs are allocated accord-
ing to the same impartial criteria used for deceased
donation, or used to create paired/pooled transplant
chains.3 Although there was some initial resistance to
the notion of N-DALD,4 it is now an accepted source
of good-quality, if few in number, donations, which
have saved additional lives.5
More recently, DALD has been cautiously
accepted in the UK. This allows donors to direct
their altruistic donations to speciﬁc recipients, even
though there may be no pre-existing relationship
between them. This has occurred in the USA since
2004 via dedicated websites such as matchingdo-
nors.com, but has only been permitted in the UK
since 2013. In the USA, matchingdonors.com
charges potential recipients a registration fee, but
any kind of commercial transaction, including
registration fees, renders DALD ineligible in the
UK. Potential donors join the website (free of
charge), look through potential recipients and
choose a potential candidate for their organ. As
well as registering on dedicated websites, patients
can advertise for potential donors via social media
such as Facebook, Twitter or Youtube. Although
there is ﬂexibility in the ﬁner details of how DALD
might operate, this paper will concentrate primarily
on the use of donor/recipient-matching websites
such as matchingdonors.com.
The adverts
Many patients’ adverts for donors feature videos,
photos and text outlining their medical condition
and their (frequently bleak) prognosis without a
transplant. This content seems unobjectionable, but
many adverts go far beyond this. Some videos/
photos include not just the patient, but also their
friends and family. These people will provide testi-
monials explaining why a donor should choose that
speciﬁc person to donate an organ to. Patients are
frequently shown surrounded by their young fam-
ilies, with their children explaining how desperately
they need their parent to receive a transplant.
While this pointedly emphasises the importance of
donating organs, it also has a potentially less desir-
able effect: organ donation becomes a form of
beauty contest where patients with the most heart-
rending story are most likely to receive transplants.
Potential recipients are also keen to demonstrate
moral worthiness: many list the charitable activities
that they support, emphasise how active they are
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within their community or local church, and highlight that their
illness is not their fault. Trying to inﬂuence people’s donation
decisions with information like this represents a signiﬁcant
departure from the usual impartial allocation procedure for
altruistically donated organs.
Policy position
DALD facilitated by websites has met with resistance in the
USA6 7 and the UK.8 The Human Tissue Authority regards
DALD as legal provided there is no evidence of reward or coer-
cion.9 There is, apparently assumed to be, an increased likelihood
of coercion or reward with DALD in comparison to living-related
donations, so the assessment process for potential donors is par-
ticularly rigorous. The British Transplant Society suggests that
non-directed altruistic donation is preferable to DALD, as it pre-
serves equity of access.10 They, therefore, suggest that the possi-
bility of non-directed donation should be discussed with all
potential DALD donors. In short, DALD appears to be tolerated
rather than promoted in the UK, unlike N-DALD, which is cele-
brated.11 The dire consequences of the organ shortage mean that
one should have good reasons for failing to take full advantage of
a particular source of donations. There may be some general con-
cerns over promoting living donation when there are still poten-
tial gains to be made in deceased donation rates (given that living
donation involves subjecting a healthy person to surgery and
deceased donation does not), but the current reluctance to
embrace and promote DALD to lessen the organ shortage
appears to be grounded in more speciﬁc concerns.
The beauty contest criticism
The existing literature discussing donor/recipient-matching web-
sites suggests that the primary objections are increased risk of
reward or coercion,6 7 and the beauty contest dynamic, which
results in allocation contrary to medical criteria.1 7 These objec-
tions seem reasonable, but concerns about reward and coercion
can be somewhat allayed by the introduction of appropriately
rigorous safeguarding and screening.
A further ethical criticism is that of the beauty contest. By this,
one need not mean that literally the most beautiful candidates are
selected, but rather that recipients are selected from a list accord-
ing to criteria that make them an attractive choice for donors.
Many of these criteria are not obviously ‘medical’. For instance,
choosing a particular recipient because they created a funny
video, or because they have young children who desperately need
a parent would clearly deviate from the usual ideas of urgency
and medical need. The idea of a beauty contest to determine who
lives and who dies certainly seems distasteful,i but distasteful is
not always unethical. Neidich et al have suggested that the beauty
contest dynamic is unacceptable because it is not compatible with
altruism. I will now explore this claim from the perspective of
donors and recipients, and will argue that if beauty contests in
organ donation represent a failure of altruism on the part of
donors then this is not unique to DALD. I will then explore the
issue from the perspective of recipients, and will argue that it is
their actions that are at odds with an altruistic donation system.
BEAUTY CONTEST AND THE DONORS
Neidich et al suggest that sites such as matchingdonors.com
‘move beyond conventional directed donation [to friends or
family members] because there is more than one identiﬁed
patient in need’ (p.44).1 This creates the beauty contest
dynamic, which allows donors to shop for a winner. If browsing
for a winner is objectionable, it may be either that choosing
between recipients is itself objectionable, or that the criteria
open to use are potentially objectionable. Choosing between
recipients per se is plainly not objectionable; members of trans-
plant staff do this all the time, and it is necessary in any trans-
plant system operating in a situation of shortage. One might
instead suggest that it is wrong for donors to choose, but this
already occurs in the directed donations to friends or family
members that are considered uncontroversial. Most people who
know someone needing a kidney transplant will also be aware
that there are lots of other, although unidentiﬁed, people who
similarly require a transplant. A potential donor may choose to
donate a kidney to his/her friend/relative over the unidentiﬁed
strangers. Living donors in the UK are asked when they donate
whether, if it transpires that their donated organ is not suitable
for the intended recipient, they are happy for it to be allocated
to the general pool. Many will presumably say yes, but in doing
so they clearly state their preference that the organ is allocated
to their chosen recipient in the ﬁrst instance. This is a case of
choosing an identiﬁed person over an unidentiﬁed person on
non-medical grounds. The situation does not necessarily seem
less acceptable, however, if a person chooses between identiﬁed
people. For instance if a person knows three people who need
transplants—a best friend, a work colleague and someone on a
donor-matching website—it is not obviously unacceptable that
he/she could choose one over the others, even if this is on the
basis of non-medical criteria such as being good friends with the
needy patient.
Neidich et al appear to be concerned about organs being allo-
cated according to what they term ‘normative classiﬁcations’,
including clinical diagnosis, race or religion (p.44).1
Unfortunately, they do not explain what they mean by normative
classiﬁcation, but one presumes that they mean something other
than just organs being allocated according to non-medical cri-
teria: I could quite acceptably donate a kidney to a close friend,
even if there were more urgent cases or better matches on the
waiting list. Classifying people into friends or non-friends is a
normative classiﬁcation, although one that is generally consid-
ered acceptable. Through a website, however, donors could be
choosing speciﬁc recipients because they are of a certain ethnic
origin, for example. Maybe, then, some normative classiﬁcations
reﬂect unacceptable prejudice. These objectionable normative
classiﬁcations can appear elsewhere within organ donation,
however; so, it would be inconsistent to single out DALD as
unacceptable. Just as someone might choose a recipient because
of certain normative classiﬁcations, people are free to choose
their friends or spouses on the same grounds—for instance some
people will only marry members of the same religion. If norma-
tive classiﬁcations shape who one is friends with then they also
play an inﬂuential role in many cases where one chooses to
donate an organ to a friend, and there is no guarantee that these
will be ‘acceptable’ normative classiﬁcations.
Neidich et al’s more general concern appears to hinge on the
suggestion that the beauty contest dynamic is not compatible
with the altruism required from donors. They suggest that altru-
ism, which is supposed to motivate organ donation, in its purest
form dictates that ‘there is no shopping among patients; rather
there is a donation to any patient with the capacity to beneﬁt’
(p.45).1 Theoretical doubts about the operation of altruism
within organ donation have already been raised,13 14 but altru-
ism still seems to be regarded by some as a necessary
iOne may recall a hoax Dutch television programme that caused
controversy when it pretended that viewers could vote on which patient
should be given a transplant.12
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requirement of ethical donation.1 Neidich et al’s suggestion that
the purest form of altruism (which presumably requires a lack of
self-interest, so that the act is disinterestedly other-regarding)
prohibits shopping among patients seems rather dubious,
however. Insistence on a pure account of altruism might still
allow, or even require, a donor to shop between potential recipi-
ents to ensure that his/her altruism is directed towards the right
person (where this is deﬁned in agent-neutral terms, and may
not correspond with the ‘right’ person as judged by medical cri-
teria). For instance, someone truly concerned about altruism
and helping other people might want to ensure that his/her
donated organ is given not just to anyone, but to someone who
will also help other people: this seems more altruistic, rather
than less. The Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics considered altruism
in some detail in a report on donation of bodily materials in the
UK (including organs), and their deﬁnition of altruism
(p.139)15 focuses on selﬂessness and lack of anticipated reward,
and so says nothing that obviously prohibits choosing recipients.
Moreover, insisting that organ donation is only ethical if it is
motivated by pure altruism will pose problems for directed
donation to family members, which is difﬁcult to conceive of as
purely altruistic. In other contexts, motivation other than purest
altruism is considered an acceptable reason to donate to a cause,
so to claim that organ donation has some privileged require-
ment of purity would require further justiﬁcation. If I choose to
donate £10 000 000 to a testicular cancer charity rather than a
breast cancer charity solely because I am a male and men’s
health is of more direct concern to me, it would seem very
demanding to suggest that my potentially life-saving donation
was unethical and should not be permitted.
It seems that it is challenging to robustly criticise DALD and
beauty contests from the perspective of donors without introdu-
cing unjustiﬁable inconsistency. Pure altruism is not required in
other aspects of organ donation, so, it would be inconsistent to
require it within DALD. We routinely let donors express prefer-
ence based on the normative classiﬁcation that ‘someone is my
friend/relative’, so, an outright ban on allocation according to
normative classiﬁcations would be difﬁcult. If the beauty contest
dynamic is objectionable, it must be for other reasons.
BEAUTY CONTEST AND THE RECIPIENTS
I have argued thus far that the beauty contest criticism is not
wholly convincing when considered from the perspective of
donors. I will now explore the beauty contest dynamic from the
perspective of recipients.
Receiving organs as a competition
Waiting lists are the means used in the UK to manage the short-
age of donated organs. Factors considered when making alloca-
tion decisions vary depending on the type of organ, but it is not
a simple case of ﬁrst-come ﬁrst-served.16 The Oxford English
Dictionary deﬁnes ‘competition’ as ‘the striving of two or more
for the same object’,17 so, in a simple sense, those who are
waiting for an organ transplant are competing against each
other. Each potential recipient on the waiting list is considered
against the relevant allocation criteria, and when an organ
becomes available, the patient at that time with the highest
‘score’ relative to that organ will be offered it.
DALD may create a beauty contest dynamic, which is plainly
competitive, but if, as suggested here, competition in a simplistic
sense exists in transplantation outside of DALD, one must
suggest why some forms of competition are considered accept-
able and others are not.
Contrasting types of competition
When organs are donated via N-DALD, or the majority of
deceased donation, the rules of the competition are straightfor-
ward. Organs are allocated according to criteria that aim to
balance waiting-list mortality and transplant outcomes.18
Although these criteria may sometimes work to the detriment of
speciﬁc individuals, they balance the competing concerns of the
overall system that operates in the context of a welfare state.
Patients who wait to receive organs via this approach to alloca-
tion may accept that although they may have to wait, those with
the most urgent need that can be effectively met will be given
priority, and that should their need become urgent, they will be
afforded this same priority. Although this may still be competi-
tion by deﬁnition, this approach can also be reasonably charac-
terised as being cooperative. They are all relying on the same
system for rescue from their plight, and patients who rely on
these systems to obtain an organ are not actively competing by
trying to gain priority for themselves, but are instead waiting
their turn on the basis of the rules of allocation.
In contrast to the orderly cooperation of impartial allocation,
the competition for organs via DALD is signiﬁcantly more active:
the behaviour of recipients can directly inﬂuence the likelihood
of them receiving a transplant. Instead of patiently waiting to
move to the top of a waiting list due to being the best match for
an organ, patients can increase their chances of being offered a
transplant by creating the most compelling back-story, creating
the best viral video or by directly contacting the greatest number
of potential donors. By competing for organs actively and trying
to get to the top of each prospective donor’s ‘list’, patients vying
for organs via DALD may give little concern to the plight of
others who also need transplants. By taking the attitude of
‘please give an organ to me rather than anybody else’, potential
recipients place their own interests ahead of others with poten-
tially much more urgent need. The consequences of this will
vary, but in some cases, it may result in people with urgent need
dying before a transplant becomes available or having to endure
extended periods of increasingly greater suffering.
This may not always seem wrong—if one is in desperately
urgent need of a life-saving resource, and is offered such a
resource, it would be very demanding to insist that one is morally
bound to pass the resource onto someone who has marginally
more urgent need for that resource, particularly if it is unlikely
that any more of that resource will become available. In many
cases, however, the disparity in urgency of need will be much
greater. Someone who could wait 2 years for a transplant trying to
place themselves ahead of someone who can only wait 2 weeks
(where they are both competing for the same donor via a website)
is akin to a strong swimmer trying to push a very weak swimmer
away from a lifeboat even though another lifeboat will probably
eventually return to pick up the strong swimmer anyway.
The competition introduced by DALD is potentially complex.
While some people who may have, otherwise, donated via
N-DALD may now choose to donate to a speciﬁc recipient,
there may be some donors who would only be motivated to
donate by the situation of a single recipient, and would not
have donated via N-DALD. In these cases, those recipients
should not be considered to be competing with anybody—in
fact, their actions here may help others, insofar as they attract a
donor who would not be willing to donate to others and
remove a patient from the waiting listii (much like living-related
iiThis point was made by an anonymous reviewer, to whom I am
grateful.
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donation). Despite this, it does seem plausible that DALD
increases the likelihood of active competition at two levels.
First, if people who would have previously donated via
N-DALD now consider donating via DALD then DALD recipi-
ents are actively competing with N-DALD recipients. Second, if
potential donors visit donor-matching websites with a relatively
open mind about to whom to donate, DALD recipients are
actively competing with one another.
It is here that there is scope for objection to the organ dona-
tion beauty contest on altruistic grounds. I do not wish to claim
that recipients are duty-bound to give consideration to other
people on the waiting list in all situations, as this may be super-
erogatory in many instances. But if potential recipients are
asking others to be moved to altruism by their need for a trans-
plant and the person that they are, it is jarringly self-regarding
for recipients to then fail to consider the situations and qualities
of similar others. These recipients are asking others to do for
them what they themselves are not willing to do for others. It
would be difﬁcult to defend the claim that a recipient ought to
act altruistically, but this is not necessary. Instead, I wish to
make the more modest claim that if it is important for a dona-
tion system to be driven by altruism, the behaviour of recipients
should at least not counteract the altruistic underpinnings of
such a system. The precise role of altruism in organ donation is
subject to debate, but the Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics has
stated that altruism ‘helps underpin a communal, and collective,
approach to the provision of bodily material for others’ needs,
where generosity and compassion are valued’ (p.132),15 and
similar claims have been made by others (p.113).14 The behav-
iour of recipients in impartial allocation systems who coopera-
tively wait their turn is aligned with the altruistic basis of the
system because the waiting list is ordered to provide the best
overall balance for everyone waiting for organs. By accepting
that organs are allocated according to the waiting list order,
patients allow for their needs and interests to be considered
against the needs and interests of other patients to ensure that
overall need is effectively met. The behaviour of many recipients
in DALD, however, can work against the role of altruism
because those taking an ‘every person for him/herself ’ approach
would likely be much more self-serving. Rather than embracing
a communal and collective approach to meeting the needs of
those who require transplants, DALD allows recipients to
actively further their own interests by leveraging their personal
appeal to place their needs above those of others, potentially at
a signiﬁcant cost to those with more urgent need.
THE EMPIRICAL QUESTIONS AND THE (UN)IMPORTANCE
OF ALTRUISM
I have examined a speciﬁc criticism of beauty contests dynamics
within organ donation, and have not given much consideration
to the potential justice issues of such a dynamic. This is partly
because many arguments have been explored already in the
context of directed deceased donation,19 and also because the
consequences are so unpredictable. The matchingdonors.com
website claims to have matched over 300 recipients since its cre-
ation,20 so has provided a tiny proportion of organ donations in
the USA. It is not obvious what its impact would be in the UK,
but one might expect similarly low numbers unless it was exten-
sively pushed as a means of promoting donation. What is espe-
cially unknown is its impact on N-DALD: for example, would
people, who would otherwise donate impartially, now choose to
donate via DALD? For reasons of efﬁciency, impartial organ
donation may be preferable to partial donation, as it allows for
organs to be given to the most medically appropriate patients. If
donor/recipient-matching websites cause people who would,
otherwise, choose to donate non-directedly to donate directedly
then this is an undesirable consequence of these sites.
Neidich et al1 and others6 7 are wise to raise concerns about
the potential for injustice to occur as a result of DALD, but the
scale and impact of this is unknown. One possible outcome is
that DALD causes people to donate who, otherwise, would not
do, and provides additional beneﬁt to transplant patients. Even
if this beneﬁt is distributed unevenly on unjustiﬁable grounds,
assuming these donations would not have happened without
DALD then accepting them makes nobody worse off.21 It is
with this consideration in mind that decisions should be made
about DALD and the future of organ donation more generally.
Neidich et al are correct to assert that aspects of DALD are not
compatible with altruism, although I have argued that this
failing lies more with recipients than donors. DALD may, there-
fore, conﬂict with organ donation’s pure (and often incorrect)
self-image of altruistic gifting. If altruism is the ethical guideline
of acceptable organ donation then DALD via websites seems at
odds with this principle, and should not be permitted.
But if, as has been suggested elsewhere,13 22 altruism may not
be a necessary condition of acceptable organ donation then pre-
venting extra donations because they do not comply with the
altruistic self-image of organ donation could be looking a gift
horse in the mouth. A donation and transplantation system
underpinned by altruism, cooperation and selﬂessness may seem
like the ideal, but clinging onto this ideal seems questionable if
it actually results in less good being done via transplantation
than the alternatives.
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